Introduction
Mapping conditions in Rakhine State
By Nathan Ruser, Elise Thomas and Mali Walker
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute's International Cyber Policy Centre has combined open-source data with the collection and analysis of new satellite imagery to assess the current status of settlements in northern Rakhine State, Myanmar, which were burned, damaged or destroyed in 2017. As part of this research project, we have also mapped potential repatriation camps and military bases constructed on the sites of former Rohingya settlements.
Our findings cast doubt on assertions that current conditions in Rakhine will enable refugees to return to safe, dignified and sustainable lives in Myanmar.
Satellite analysis shows minimal preparation for a return of half a million refugees. The preparations that are being made raise significant concerns about the conditions under which returning Rohingya would be expected to live. The ongoing violence, instability, disruptions to internet and communications technologies and the lack of information about the security situation in Rakhine add to those concerns.
Key Findings
- More than 320 settlements show no sign of reconstruction.
- At least 40% of affected settlements have been razed.
- At least 45 camps have been constructed or enlarged (some of the camps are believed to be for internally displaced people, returning refugees, or both).
- Six military facilities have been built or expanded on former Rohingya settlements.
- In addition to the UNOSAT data, we have identified at least 58 settlements which have been subject to new demolition in 2018. Separate to these 58 settlements, satellite imagery also shows demolition has occurred in other settlements in 2019.
The crisis
In August 2017, the Myanmar military initiated a brutal crackdown on Rohingya living in northern Rakhine State. The army claimed to be responding to prior attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army on police posts and an army base.
The Myanmar military has been accused of mass killings, widespread sexual violence and burning entire villages to the ground (pictured: freshly burned Rohingya villages in September 2017).
At least 392 villages were damaged during this crisis. Médecins Sans Frontières has estimated that 9,400 Rohingya were killed between 25 August and 24 September 2017. The UN’s Independent Fact-finding Mission found that, by August 2018, nearly 725,000 Rohingya had fled to Bangladesh.
The UN investigation found that the Myanmar military committed ‘consistent patterns of serious human rights violations’ against the Rohingya that the media suggest may amount to crimes against humanity.
The International Criminal Court is considering opening a full investigation into alleged atrocities against the Rohingya in Myanmar.
Stalled return
As part of those agreements, the Myanmar Government said it has constructed ‘reception’ and ‘transit’ centres to facilitate the return of the refugees.
However, repatriation efforts have continued to stall because of a range of issues. Human rights organisations have continuously expressed concerns that conditions aren’t in place to ensure a safe return.
In early 2018, a small number of refugees attempted to return to Rakhine of their own volition. They were arrested by the Myanmar Government, and some were given prison sentences. It was reported that they would be transferred to the Hla Pho Khaung Transit Centre in Rakhine State.
In November 2018, an attempt was made by Bangladesh to begin repatriation. While promising that the return would be voluntary, safe and dignified, the Bangladeshi authorities deployed the army into refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar – the largest refugee settlement in Bangladesh. Under international pressure, however, the government later paused repatriation efforts.
As of April 2019, more than 910,000 Rohingya live in refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar (pictured).
The ASEAN report
The ASEAN report outlines a process that would see 500,000 Rohingya refugees return to Myanmar over a period of six years. It also recommends how that process could be accelerated. As of April 2019, more than 910,000 Rohingya live in refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar.
Returning refugees will first pass through ‘reception centres’, which are intended to process 300 refugees per day. From the ‘reception centres’, refugees will be sent to a ‘transit centre’.
According to ASEAN, the Hla Pho Khaung Transit Centre (pictured) can accommodate 25,000 people in ‘temporary shelters’ at eight families per shelter. There’s additional capacity to accommodate returning refugees in ‘container-type’ shelters.
According to the report, refugees will remain in the transit centre for up to 30 days.
The Villages
The villages
We used that data, and our own satellite imagery collection and analysis, to make an updated assessment of the status of these settlements. We found as follows:
- More than 320 settlements show no sign of reconstruction.
- At least 40% of affected settlements have been razed.
- In addition to the UNOSAT data, we have identified at least 58 settlements which have been subject to new demolition in 2018. Separate to these 58 settlements, satellite imagery also shows demolition has occurred in other settlements in 2019.
Click here to open a map of our findings in a new window.
Ongoing destruction
In our research, we have documented at least 58 remaining settlements that have been burned, partially destroyed or demolished in northern Rakhine State throughout 2018. Further satellite evidence shows continuing demolition in 2019.
Click the button in the bottom left corner for a before/after comparison of the village of Maw with buildings still standing after the crackdown in 2017 and with all buildings razed in April 2018.
The laws
The Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law was amended in 2018. Owners of land designated as vacant, fallow or virgin—including land in Rakhine—were given six months to apply for land-ownership permits. The deadline was 11 March 2019.
The application process for these permits was inaccessible to many Rohingya owing to the considerable restrictions on their movement within Myanmar and from settlements in Bangladesh. This means that they may be evicted, fined and, potentially, imprisoned if they try to return to their land without a permit.
In addition, Myanmar’s Natural Disaster Management Law allows the government to ‘manage’ designated disaster zones, such as burned areas. Minister for Social Development, Relief and Resettlement Win Myat Aye said in 2017, ‘According to the law, burnt land becomes government-managed land.’
Over 80% of the settlements considered in this study show no signs of reconstruction. We found no cases of significant residential reconstruction within destroyed areas. Therefore, it appears unlikely that most refugees will be able to return to their original homes and land. This raises questions about where the Myanmar Government intends them to live instead.
The Camps
The camps
The camps vary significantly in size and structure. By far the largest is the Hla Pho Khaung Transit Centre, which the Myanmar Government says can hold 25,000 refugees in 625 ‘temporary shelters’. An additional 1,090 ‘container-type’ shelters may also be used.
The relocation sites
The Kyein Chaung relocation site is built on the site of a burned Rohingya village. The ASEAN report states that refugees in relocation sites may own their houses, but that the land is now owned by the Myanmar Government. According to the report, houses will be constructed in 10 days and are expected to last for 10–15 years.
The new construction at the site strongly resembles a camp, rather than the villages that existed before the crackdown.
Click the button in the bottom left corner to see a before/after comparison of Kyein Chaung with burned Rohingya villages in 2017 and with new construction as of 20 May 2019.
The Military Bases
The military bases
The ASEAN report highlights the need for ‘heightened security measures for a safe community’ and draws attention to the Border Guard Police (BGP) posts spread throughout northern Rakhine State. Satellite evidence confirms the highly securitised nature of northern Rakhine.
These trends are evident in the village of Aung Zan, a few kilometres from the Bangladesh border. This small village is split into two hamlets and includes roughly 50 structures. Large parts of the village were burned during the 2017 crisis. Throughout 2018, the only new construction in the village was of a security post near the town and the increased fortification of one of the suspected BGP posts in the village. In addition, outlying residential structures were demolished during 2018. The remaining structures in Aung Zan were almost all demolished in the first three months of 2019, with the exception of the BGP posts.
Click the button in the bottom left corner to see a before/after comparison.
Conclusion
Conclusion
Satellite analysis shows minimal preparation for a return of half a million refugees. The preparations that are being made raise significant concerns about the conditions under which returning Rohingya refugees would be expected to live.
Ongoing violence, instability, disruptions to internet and communications technologies and the lack of information about the security situation in Rakhine state add to these concerns.
This research seeks to add to the evidence base available to policymakers and relevant stakeholders about conditions in northern Rakhine, and Rakhine State more broadly. It also seeks to contribute to informed discussions about the best path towards a safe, dignified and sustainable future for the Rohingya refugees.
Methodology & About us
UNOSAT data was used to identify the 392 settlements that were burned, damaged or destroyed during the 2017 crackdown. UNOSAT describes itself as a technology-intensive program developed under the UN Institute for Training and Research. At the request of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, UNOSAT used satellite imagery analysis and fire-detection data to map the destruction of villages between 25 August 2017 and 18 March 2018.
We then used a combination of Google Earth, Planet Labs and commercial satellite imagery to find the most up-to-date satellite imagery of the 392 settlements. We assessed whether damaged settlements had been razed or left burnt. This was mostly assessed based on whether damaged structures and trees remained. If we saw reconstruction, we characterised it as residential, camp or military construction. Satellite imagery has been attributed on the image or credited to Digital Globe, a Maxar Company, via Google.
Satellite imagery is inherently varied in quality and acquisition dates. Our analysis conducted used multiple sources of satellite imagery, and we always sought to use and analyse the highest quality and the most recent imagery available. However, a limited number of ambiguous cases may be interpreted differently from our assessments, especially with the addition of more recent imagery. We don’t expect those cases to cover a significant proportion of our sample or to affect the conclusions that we’ve reached.
We also looked beyond the 392 settlements identified by UNOSAT and identified cases where settlements have been subject to new burning and demolition in other parts of northern Rakhine state. Some of this has occurred in 2018 and in 2019 in settlements not previously identified in the UNOSAT dataset. In a similar manner, we also broadly surveyed satellite imagery for newly constructed repatriation sites in northern Rakhine State.
We corroborated our analysis with other open-source information including reports about the transit and reception centres from civil society organisations and information from the ASEAN report. This research has undergone peer review and external consultation.
About us
ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre focuses on the growing importance of cyber and technology-related issues for broader strategic policy. The centre’s growing team of analysts have a mixture of expertise that include specialisations in policy issues, technical capabilities, Asian languages, satellite analysis and human rights. The centre has a mixed funding base and receives project and sponsorship funding from a range of government, industry and civil society groups, in Australia and internationally. This research project had no primary funder.
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